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'

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-MARKETABLE TITLE TO REALTY-PERFECTING TITLE BY LITIGATION AS AN INCIDENT TO SPECIFIC PER, FORMANCE-The normal action on land contracts is two-sided, vendor
against purchaser or purchaser against vendor, to settle the rights of the
parties on the basis of the condition of V's title at the time of the decree. This action is quite satisfactory where V and P agree as to the
condition of the title, whether free and clear or not, but must we adhere to this pattern when there is a controversy between them concerning the title? To make the question concrete, suppose that V
claims he has an unencumbered fee simple while P asserts there is a
paramount easement in favor of X, or, a faint echo of the same case, V
claims unencumbered fee simple and P, though not positively asserting
the existence of the easement, points to some evidence of an easement
and insists that this makes V's title unmarketable. The crux of such a
case is the controversy between V and X, an actual, present controversy
if X is actively pressing his claim, a potential controversy if he is not,
and this V-X controversy cannot be conclusively adjudicated in a suit
between V and P. Yet the normal way, the almost universal way, to
deal with this type of case is the two-sided V-P suit, wherein the court,
not attempting to decide whether X's claim is valid, for this is beyond
its power in the V-P action, deals instead with the elusive question
whether X's claim is sufficiently plausible to render V's title unmarketable.1 If such is the fact, complete specific performance cannot be obSee Aigler, "Title Problems in Land Transfers," 24 M1cH. S.B.J. 202 at
(1945); 57 A.L.R. 1253 (1928).
1
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tained in the normal two-sided action, and the plaintiff must content
himself with rescissi9n or damages. 2
But a choice between these remedies may be less satisfactory to P
than some device to make V try to obtain marketable title. Or, on the
other hand, V may wish to clear .up some doubtful element in his
title and complete the contract, rather than let P rescind or have an
action for damages. Equity courts, in whose eyes the legal remedy
for breach of land contracts is inadequate, might find merit in remedies
aimed at litigation to perfect the title with complete performance of
the contract.
Relief of this nature has been available to either party, in some
cases, by making X a party defendant to the action. With both V and
X before it, the court will settle the controversy between them and, if
V's title is good, decree specific performance.3 Lack of jurisdiction
over X is not necessarily fatal if the land is in the jurisdiction, for 'the
in rem powers of the court may be invoked to determine X's rights.4
But this three-sided action is not always available. The court may, in
its discretion, find the action multifarious. If X is entitled to a jury
trial and insists upon his right, he cannot be joined unless jury trials
are provided in equitable actions, and even where juries are available
in equity, the court may refuse tt> interfere with the usual ejectment
procedure.5 As may be expected, where V's conduct is subject to
criticism, there is some tendency to sustain P's objection to the joinder
of X. 6
A possible alternative to the three-party action is a decree ordering
one of the parties to commence litigation to perfect the title as an inci2

See Linville, "Purchaser's Remedies for Absence of Marketable Title," 36
L. REv. 56 (1937). Presumably no court would, in the type of case where
X's claim is of unpredictable validity, decree specific performance with abatement of
the price. See Brisbane v. Sullivan, 86 N.J. Eq. 411, 99 A. 197 (.1916).
8
WALSH, EQUITY,§ 75 (1930); Huber v. Johnson, 174 Ky. 697, 192 S.W. 821
(1917) (X claimed under a prior deed); Maynard v. Lowe, 231 Ky. 258, 21 S.W.
(2d) 285 (1929) (X in adverse possession); Noyes v. Bragg, 220 Mass. 106, 107
N.E. 669 (1915) (X claiming as second purchaser from V); Sutliff v. Smith, 58
Kan. 559, 50 P. 455 (1897) (V contracted to remove X's claims, but P acquired
them).
4
See HusToN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF DECREES IN EQUITY 13-25 (1915) for
the development of statutes on in rem powers. Courts have sometimes exceeded statutory authority: Rourke v. McLaughlin, 38 Cal. 196 (1869); Tennant's Heirs v.
Fretts, 67 W. Va. 569, 68 S.E. 387 (1910).
5
Hughes v. Hannah, 39 Fla. 365, 22 S. 613 (1897). See also, Basey v.
Gallagher, 20 Wall (87 U.S.) 670 (1874).
6
Marsh v. Lorimer, 164 La. 175, l 13 S. 808 (1927), (V cannot object to dismissal of his second vendee, whose contract he sought to have cancelled in order to
enforce his first contract against P); Braxton Realty Inv. Co. v. Schellenberg, (Mo.
1940) 142 S.W. (2d) 1006.
MICH.
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dent to specific performance. Such a decree was issued in the recent
case of Henschke v. Y oung.1 In that case, V agreed to furnish an
abstract or Torrens certificate showing marketable title, and to correct
written objections to it within 90 days of the time they were made.
If the corrections were not made, the contract was to be void. In fact,
V never furnished any certificate of title. 8 On P's suit for specific
, performance, the court, unable to determine the validity of certain
outstanding liens on the land, ordered V to conduct an action to determine them, and to convey to P. P was ordered to pay into court a
sum large enough to assure payment of the balance due after the discharge of such outstanding claims as should be found valid.
The above decision, requiring V to litigate claims against his title, ,
raises some interesting questions. Under what circumstances will litigation be ordered, and for the removal of what type of defect? Will P
eyer be required to bring an action to clear the title? What of the
situation where either V or P desires to perfect the title himself, with
specific performance of the contract if his action succeeds?
The question as to requiring P to litigate the title may be quickly
answered: I! need not "buy a lawsuit"; surely the courts will not
order him to prosecute one, absent unusual contract provisions! V's
position is not improved by an offer•to pay the estimated cost of the
litigation, which may lessen P's expense but not the risk of loss of title,
nor by a showing that P's action would probably be successful.9 ·
The vendor who desires to litigate the title himself is in. a somewhat stronger ethical position. His problem is to obtain judicial assurance that P cannot terminate the contract before his litigation is ended.10
Yet the justice of granting an interlocutory decree to protect him is
doubtful. It would deprive P of the right to make the time element
.material and rescind the contract, without making the time of performance certain.11 It would establish V's right to performance by P
while giving no assurance of his own ultimate ability to perform.12
1

(Minn. 1947) 28 N.W. (2d) 766 (1947).
Therefore, no written objections were made, the 90-day period never began
to run, and the contract was not void.
9
Wakeland v. Robertson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 219 S.W. 842 (V tendered
the estimated cost of the litigation) ; Triplett v. Bucholtz, 99 Fla. l I I 2, I 28 S. 26 5
( 1930) (V tendered a deed stating that his tenant's lease was in default).
10
In Haumersen v. Sladky, 220 Wis. 91, 264 N.W. 653 (1936), a vendor
obtained an interlocutory decree for specific performance before removing defects in
the chain of title and an outstanding tax deed. No litigation was involved in clearing
his title, however.
11 P has such a right. Ames, "Mutuality in Specific Performance," 3· CoL. L.
REv. I at 7 (1903); Bank of Columbia v. Hagner, l Pet. (26 U.S.) 455 at 467
(1809); Dresel v. Jordan, 104 Mass. 407 (1870).
12 On the doctrine of mutuality of obligation, see Durfee, "Mutuality in Specific Performance," 20 MxcH. L. REv. 289 at 305 (1922).
8
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Only where P is willing to await the outcome of the litigation and
accept whatever V can eventually convey would such a decree be warranted, and in that situation it is hardly necessary. This type of relief
has been denied whether V's suit to clear title is prospective or already
pending.18
It is easier to justify a decree ordering further litigation at P's request than at V's request. Language of court and text writer lays
down the general duty of a vendor to perform to the extent of his
ability, which would seem to remove the stigma of "making a contract." 14 Where V has a contract to buy the land, P can, in a suit for
specific performance, compel him to exercise his right to purchase
under the first contract in order to be able to perform the second.15
To make him exercise the right to perfect his title would seem §omewhat akin to this, although the analogy cannot be pressed.10 V's expense
should not be materially greater than where P deducts from the purchase price the costs of defending actions brought against him by X.
Enforced perfecting of the title would often be preferable to abatement of the price, as it would reduce the element of uncertainty in the
transaction. Mutuality of performance could be assured by the decree,
and it seems probable that V's self-interest in preventing the loss of his
estate would assure a vigorous prosecution of. the action. Since two
actions are required, however, this procedure will be less efficient than
the three-party action, and there is always the danger that V's suit
against X may not be prosecuted competently. This type o~ remedy
would seem most attractive in situations where ejectment must be
brought against X, so that he cannot b~ joined in the original action.
The device of requiring a vendor to perfect his title by litigation
has not been used so frequently that any general pattern of law has
developed around it. It must be expected that some courts will, without
adequate consideration of the alternatives, apply the age-ripened formula
of the traditic;mal two-party action, that equity will not require conveyance of what the defendant does not possess.17 This occurred in Cattell
18
McAllister v. Hannan, 101 Va. 17, 42 S.E. 920 (1902), and Wold v. Newgaard, 123 Iowa 233, 98 N.W. 640 (1904) (suits pending); People v. Open Board,
92 N.Y. 98 (1883) (suits not yet commenced).
14 WALSH, EQUITY, § 76 ( I 930); McCLINTOCK ON EQUITY, 2d ed., § 64
(1936); Bailey v. Conley, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 129, 26 S.W. 391 (1894).
15
Brin v. Michalski, 188 Mich. 400, 154 N.W. 110 (1915); Cutler v. Lovinger, 212 Mich. 272, 180 N.W. 462 (1920).
16
The contract right may be more certain than the right to remove a cloud.,
Whether the amount due on a contract can be paid out of the purchase price is readily
ascertainable; not so, perhaps, with regard to the cost of a lawsuit.
17
The common tendency of the courts has been to emphasize the hardship of
requiring a vendor to perform, rather than the usually superior equitable position of
the purchaser. See 34 MICH. L. REv. 890 (1936).
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v. Jefferson,18 a case where the device would have been peculiarly appropriate.10 But the remedy has been employed occasionally, and some
observations on the decisions may be useful.
The holding in Henschke v. Young 20 does not go as far as one
might suppose from the statement that litigation to clear the title was
ordered. The purpose of this litigation was merely to ascertain what
, outstanding claims were valid, to be discharged by P out of the purchase price. 2 1. The similarity to cases where purchase money is used
to satisfy liquidated claims against the fand is manifest. It appeared,
furthermore, that P desired a conveyance from V, whether or not
any of the outstanding claims was removed. One may wonder whether
the court would have ordered an action to determine claims which
might prove to be paramount and irredeemable. The answer might
depend on the purchaser's willingness to accept partial performance
rather than insisting upon rescission if the litigation should be determined adversely. 22
In Douglass v. Ransom,23 relied on in Henschke v. Young, the
contract called for marketable title which V failed to provide. The
decree of the trial court, ordering him to prosecute actions to perfect
his title, was affirmed, although it appeared that the title could be
cleared more quickly and cheaply by the use of affidavits and court
orders. The decision is a square holding on the power of a court of
equity to compel litigation to make a title marketable. It adds little
'to Henschke v. Young, ·however, in laying down a test to determine
when such an order may be obtained, or what the nature of the defect
must be: there seemed to be no doubt that the litigation would be successful and that P intended to accept whatever title V could convey.
Easton v. Lockhart 24 goes further on its facts than the two more
recent cases discussed above. V's title was clouded by a mortgage,
18

(App. D.C. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 317.
V contracted to clear his title by litigation. P, who Jiad advanced $ IO00 to
finance the litigation with the understanding that this sum was to be deducted from the
price of the land as to which good title was secured, offered all necessary additional
funds on the same basis. Specific performance against the vendor was denied.
20
(Minn. 1947) 28 N.W.. (2d) 766 (1947). The facts of the case are presented, supra.
2
1. "In this manner the court may, if necessary, determine the nature, validity, and
amount of all outstanding liens." Id. at 770.
22
It seems probable that, on a theory of mutuality, the courts would ordinarily
require assurance that P will accept whatever title V can ultimately convey, before
ordering V to litigate his title. Such relief might well be denied a purchaser who will
not accept partial performance, but will rescind if the litigation is not successful.
But see Easton v. Lockhart, IO N.D. 181, 86 N.W. 697 (1901), discussed, infra.
23
205 Wis. 439, 237 N.W. -260 (1931).
24 IO N.D. 181, 86 N.W. '697 (1901).
19
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a contract, and a deed. It appeared that P could not finance the transaction at all unless the title were perfected and that the success of the
litigation was at least uncertain. Still, the trial court ordered prosecution of actions in the district and circuit courts to clear title. The case
seems to be authority, then, for the granting of such relief even though
the effort to clear title may be unsuccessful, and even though P will
rescind the contract in that event. As such, however, it is somewhat
weakened by the fact that the decree was reversed on other grounds.2 5
The equities in favor of the purchaser seeking litigation to perfect
an unmarketable title would seem to be strengthened where there is
a contract provision for litigation by the vendor. Yet in Cattell v.
Jefferson, noted above, this factor was ignored. Perhaps the court
thought it unconscionable for P to insist on strict performance when
he knew of defects in the title at the time of the. contract.26 Since
knowledge of a defect militates against specific performance with abatement of price, it might be thought to preclude specific performance
with litigation at V's expense. But the comparison is strained: ordering
litigation which was promised is not super-adding something to the
remedy of specific performance; it is only a strict enforcement of the
contract. The old rule followed in Cattell v. Jefferson is founded
on the doctrine of hardship, but the express promise for which consideration is given should remove enforced litigation from the "hardship"
category.21
• From P's viewpoint, a decree permitting him to bring an action
against X, with specific performance if he is successful, might be more
desirable than one ordering V to commence such litigation, for it would
give P control of the action. Such a decree may be justified on the
ground that P is the real party in interest, and that this is not far
removed from applying to the purchase price P's costs of defending
an ejectment action brought against him by X. Some protection of
V's interest in the controversy would have to be worked out-a problem which would be minimized where a considerable portion of the
purchase money has already been paid. As noted above, however, this
remedy would be most useful when X cannot be joined in the original
action against V, as where ejectment must be bro1;1ght. But it is in
precisely the case where ejectment must be brought against X, that
this remedy may be the least practicable. In many states, the plaintiff
25
Performance by P had not been assured by requiring him to pay the purchase
money into court, and the contract itself was not specifically enforceable under the
circumstances of the case. Later litigation of the case, 62 N.D. 767, 89 N.W. 75
(1902), did not involve the present problem.
26
See Peeler v. Levy, 26 N.J. Eq. 330 (1875).
27
See note 17, supra.
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in ejectment actions must own legal title. In such jurisdictions, as a
prerequisite to i:ming
P would have to complete his payments and
obtai:1;1 a conveyance from V. Where P is sufficie.ntly concerned over
X's asserted interest in the land to raise the issue, it is doubtful that
his desire to control an action against X would induce him to invest
the total contract pric(? in the land before having X's claim adjudicated.
Despite its limitations, then, the traditional two-party action will
probably remain the most practicable remedy for the purchaser who
cannot settle the claims pf the third party in one action, until the courts
have developed further the remedies suggested by the decree in
Henschke v. Young.J; R. Mackenzie, S.Ed.
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